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Static stability in strategic games differs from dynamic stability in only considering the 
players’ incentives to change their strategies. It does not rely on any assumptions about the 
players’ reactions to these incentives and it is thus independent of the law of motion (e.g., 
whether players move simultaneously or sequentially). Examples of static notions of stability 
include evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and continuously stable strategy (CSS), both of 
which are meaningful or justifiable only for particular classes of symmetric and population 
games, such as games with multilinear payoff functions or with unidimensional strategy 
spaces. This paper presents a general notion of static stability in symmetric  -player games 
and population games with non-discrete strategy spaces, of which ESS and CSS are 
essentially special cases. JEL Classification: C72. 
Keywords: Static stability, evolutionarily stable strategy, continuously stable strategy, risk 
dominance, potential games. 
1  Introduction 
A strategic game is at equilibrium when the players do not have any incentives to act 
differently than they do. In other words, at an equilibrium point, no player can increase his 
payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. Stability differs in referring to the effects – 
either on the players’ incentives or on the actual strategy choices – of starting at another, 
usually close-by, point. Notions of stability that only examine incentives may be broadly 
classified as static, and those that look at the consequent changes of strategies may be 
referred to as dynamic. (For a brief review of some additional notions of stability in strategic 
games, which fit neither of these categories, see Appendix A.) Dynamic stability relies on a 
specific law of motion, such as the replicator dynamics. It thus depends both on the game 
itself, that is, on the payoff functions, and on the choice of dynamics. Static stability, by 
contrast, depends only on intrinsic properties of the game, and is hence arguably the more 
basic, fundamental concept. This is not an assessment of the relative importance of the two 
kinds of stability, but of the logical relation between them.   
This paper presents a notion of static stability in symmetric  -player games and in 
population games that is universal in that it does not depend on structures or properties 
(such as multilinearity of the payoff function) that only certain kinds of games have. Stability 
may be local or global. In the former case, it refers to a designated topology on the strategy 
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space, which gives a meaning to a neighborhood of a strategy. In this paper, there are no 
restrictions on the choice of topology, which may in particular be the trivial topology, where 
the only neighborhood of any strategy is the entire strategy space. The latter choice 
corresponds to global stability, and it is most natural in the case of finite strategy spaces.  
The definition of (static) stability in this paper is based on a very simple idea, namely, 
examination of the incentive to switch from a strategy   to another strategy   in all states in 
which only these two strategies are used, so that some of the players use   and the others 
use  . Stability of   means that, for every   in a neighborhood of  , these incentives are 
negative on average. Formally, this definition represents minimal divergence from the 
(Nash) equilibrium concept. However, the latter does not imply stability and, in general, it is 
also not implied by it. The paper’s focus is on stable equilibrium strategies, which satisfy 
both conditions. For a number of large, important classes of symmetric and population 
games, it examines the specific meaning of stability (in the above sense) in the class. In some 
cases, the latter turns out to be equivalent, or essentially so, to an established “native” 
notion of stability. Evolutionary stability for symmetric       games and continuous stability 
for games with unidimensional strategy spaces are examples of this. The definition outlined 
above thus turns static stability from a generic notion to a concrete, well-defined one. 
The reliance of static stability solely on incentives makes it particularly suitable for use in 
comparative statics analysis. In particular, in turns out that the welfare effects of altruism 
and spite, that is, whether people in a group where everyone shares such sentiments are 
likely to fare better or worse than in a group where people are indifferent to the others’ 
payoffs, depend on the static stability or instability of the corresponding equilibrium 
strategies (Milchtaich, 2012). Such a connection between stability and comparative statics is 
akin to Samuelson’s (1983) “correspondence principle”. 
2  Symmetric and population games 
A symmetric  -player game (     ) is a real-valued (payoff
1) function          that is 
defined on the  -times Cartesian product of a (finite or infinite nonempety) set  , the 
players’ common strategy space, and is invariant to permutations of its second through  th 
arguments. If one player uses strategy   and the others use        , in any order, the first 
player’s payoff is             . A strategy   is a (symmetric Nash) equilibrium strategy in 
 , with the equilibrium payoff           , if it is a best response to itself: for every 
strategy  , 
                         
A population game, as defined in this paper, is formally a symmetric two-player game   
such that the strategy space   is a convex set in a (Hausdorff real) linear topological space 
(for example, the unit simplex in a Euclidean space) and        is continuous in   for all 
     . However, the game is interpreted not as representing an interaction between two 
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specific players but as one involving an (effectively) infinite
2 population of individuals who 
are “playing the field”. This means that an individual’s payoff        depends only on his 
own strategy   and on the population strategy  . The latter may be, for example, the 
population’s mean strategy with respect to some nonatomic measure, which attaches zero 
weight to each individual. In this case, the meaning of the equilibrium condition  
            
   
       
is that, in a monomorphic population, where everyone plays  , single individuals cannot 
increase their payoff by choosing any other strategy. Alternatively, a population game   may 
describe a dependence of an individual’s payoff on the distribution of strategies in the 
population (Bomze and Pötscher, 1989), with the latter expressed by the population strategy 
 . In this case,   consists of mixed strategies, that is, probability measures on some 
underlying space of allowable actions or (pure
3) strategies, and        is linear in   and 
expresses the expected payoff for an individual whose choice of strategy is random with 
distribution  . Provided the space   is rich enough, the equilibrium condition (2) now means 
that the population strategy   is supported in the collection of all best response pure 
strategies. In other words, the (possibly) polymorphic population is in an equilibrium state. 
Example 1. Random matching in a symmetric multilinear game (Bomze and Weibull, 1995; 
Broom et al., 1997). The   players in a symmetric  -player game   are picked up 
independently and randomly from an infinite population of potential players. The strategy 
space   is a convex set in a linear topological space, and   is continuous and is linear in each 
of its arguments. (This assumption may be relaxed by not requiring linearity in the first 
argument.) Because of the multilinearity of  , a player’s expected payoff only depends on 
his own strategy   and on the population’s mean strategy  . Specifically, it is given by 
 ̅                    
This defines a population game  ̅       . Clearly, a strategy   is an equilibrium strategy 
in  ̅ if and only if it is an equilibrium strategy in the underlying  -player game  .  
Example 2. Nonatomic congestion game. An infinite population of identical users, modeled 
as the unit interval      , shares a finite number   of common resources (for example, road 
segments). The cost of using each resource   (for example, the time is takes to traverse the 
road) depends on the size of the set of its users. This dependence is specified by a 
continuous and strictly increasing cost function                 . Each user   has to 
choose a subset of resources (for example, a route, comprising several road segments), 
which can be expressed as a binary vector                             , where            
or   indicates that resource   is included or is not included in  ’s choice, respectively. The 
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vector must belong to a specified finite collection   ̌   {   } , which describes the allowable 
subsets of resources (for example, all routes from town   to town  ). The population 
strategy   is the users’ mean choice:  




It lies in the convex hull of   ̌  
         ̌       
and it is well-defined if for each   the set {          ∣ ∣           } is measurable. The 
population strategy determines the cost of each allowable subset of resources, and more 
generally, the cost of each (mixed) strategy                     . Specifically, the 
negative of the latter, which is the payoff       , is given by 
          ∑        
 
   
  
This defines a population game         .  
3  Static stability 
By far the most well-known kind of static stability in symmetric two-player games and 
population games is evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith, 1982).  
Definition 1. A strategy   in a symmetric two-player game or population game   is an 
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) or a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) if, for every strategy 
     , for sufficiently small
4       the inequality  
                                          
or a similar weak inequality, respectively, holds. An ESS or NSS with uniform invasion 
barrier satisfies the stronger condition obtained by interchanging the two logical quantifiers: 
For sufficiently small       (which cannot vary with  ), (5) or a similar weak inequality, 
respectively, holds for all      . 
Continuous stability (Eshel and Motro, 1981; Eshel, 1983) is another kind of static stability, 
which is applicable to games with a unidimensional strategy space. 
Definition 2. In a symmetric two-player game or population game   with a strategy space 
that is a (finite or infinite) interval in the real line  , an equilibrium strategy   is a 
continuously stable strategy (CSS) if it has a neighborhood where, for every strategy      , 
for sufficiently small       the inequality  
                           
holds and a similar inequality with   replaced by –  does not hold. 
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In other words, a strategy   that satisfies the “global” condition of being an equilibrium 
strategy
5 is a CSS if it also satisfies the “local” condition (known as m-stability or 
convergence stability; Taylor, 1989; Christiansen, 1991) that every nearby strategy   is not a 
best response to itself, specifically, any small deviation from   towards  , but not in the 
other direction, increases the payoff.  
Yet another static notion of stability in symmetric and (with      ) population games is 
local superiority (or strong uninvadability; Bomze, 1991).  
Definition 3. A strategy   in a symmetric  -player game or population game   is locally 
superior if it has a neighborhood where, for every strategy      , 
                         
Local superiority is applicable to any symmetric or population game in which the strategy 
space is a topological space, so that the notion of neighborhood is well defined.
6 It does not 
rely on any other properties of the strategy space or of the payoff function – unlike ESS and 
CSS, which would not be meaningful without a linear structure. It is well known (see 
Section ‎ 6) that in the special case of symmetric       games local superiority is in fact 
equivalent to the ESS condition. However, for games with a unidimensional strategy space 
(Section ‎ 7) local superiority and CSS are not equivalent.  
The next section presents a universal notion of static stability, that is, one which is applicable 
to all symmetric and population games. It (essentially) gives ESS and CSS as special cases 
when applied to specific classes of games.  
4  A general framework 
Inequality (1) in the equilibrium condition and inequality (7) in the definition of local 
superiority both concern a player’s lack of incentive to use a particular alternative   to his 
strategy  . In the equilibrium condition, all the other players are using  , and in local 
superiority, they all use  . Stability, as defined below, differs from both concepts in 
considering not only the incentives to be first or last to move from   to   but also all the 
intermediate cases. In the simplest version, which is given by the followings definition (and is 
extended in Section ‎ 4.2), the same weight is attached to all cases. Put differently, stability 
requires that, when the players move one-by-one to   from  , the corresponding changes of 
payoff are negative on average.  
Definition 4. A strategy   in a symmetric  -player game          is stable, weakly stable 
or definitely unstable if it has a neighborhood where, for every strategy      , the inequality  
 
 
∑           ⋟    
         
      ⋟  
         
              ⋟    
         
      ⋟  
         
  
 
   
     
a similar weak inequality or the reverse (strict) inequality, respectively, holds.  
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Stability, as defined here, is a local concept. It refers to neighborhood systems of strategies 
or equivalently to a topology on the strategy space  . The topology may be explicitly 
specified or it may be understood from the context. The latter applies when   may be 
naturally viewed as a subspace of a Euclidean space or some other standard topological 
space, so that its topology is the relative one. For example, if the strategy space is an interval 
in the real line  , so that strategies are simply (real) numbers, a set of strategies is a 
neighborhood of a strategy   if and only if, for some      , every       with             is 
in the set. In a game with a finite number of strategies, it may seem natural to consider the 
discrete topology, that is, to view strategies as isolated. However, as discussed in Section ‎ 5 
below, a more useful choice of topology in a finite game is the trivial, or indiscrete, topology. 
This choice effectively puts topology out of the way, since the only neighborhood of any 
strategy is the entire strategy space. The trivial topology may be used also with an infinite  . 
Stability, weak stability or definite instability of a stategy   with respect to the trivial 
topology automatically implies the same with respect to any other topology. Such a strategy 
  will be referred to as globally stable, weakly stable or definitely unstable, respectively. 
In some classes of games (see Section ‎ 6, ‎ 8 and ‎ 9), stability of a strategy automatically implies 
that it is an equilibrium strategy. However, in general, neither of these conditions implies the 
other. The difference is partially due to equilibrium being a global condition: all alternative 
strategies, not only nearby ones, are considered. However, is persists if ‘equilibrium’ is 
replaced by ‘local equilibrium’ (with the obvious meaning), and also if the strategy space has 
the trivial topology, which obviates the distinction between local and global. A stable 
equilibrium strategy is a strategy that satisfies both conditions. It is not difficult to see that in 
the special case of a symmetric two-player game, where the equilibrium condition can be 
written as (2) and (8) can be rearranged to read  
 
 
(                                 )      
a strategy   is a stable equilibrium strategy if and only if it has a neighborhood where, for 
every      , the inequality 
                                                  
holds for all            . This condition means that the alternative strategy   affords a 
lower expected payoff than   against an uncertain strategy that may be   or  , with the 
former no more likely than the latter.  
Local superiority is similar to stability in being a local condition. And for equilibrium 
strategies in symmetric two-player games locally superiority implies stability, since (with 
     ) inequality (9) can be obtained by averaging (1) and (7). The same is true for certain 
kinds of symmetric games with more than two players (see Section ‎ 9). However, even for 
equilibrium strategies in two-player games, the reverse implication does not generally hold 
(see Section ‎ 7). 
(9) 
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4.1  Stability in population games  
Stability in population games can be defined by a variant of Definition 4 that replaces the 
number of players using strategy   or   with the size of the subpopulation to which the 
strategy applies,   or       respectively. Correspondingly, the sum in (8) is replaced with an 
integral. 
Definition 5. A strategy   in a population game          is stable, weakly stable or 
definitely unstable if it has a neighborhood where, for every strategy      , the inequality  
∫ (                                       )  
 
 
     
a similar weak inequality or the reverse (strict) inequality, respectively, holds.  
The difference between stability in the sense of Definition 5 and in the sense of (the two 
versions of) ESS (Definition 1) boils down to a different meaning of proximity between 
population strategies. The definition of ESS reflects the view that a population strategy is 
close to   if the latter applies to a large subpopulation, of size      , and another strategy   
applies to a small subpopulation, of size  . By contrast, in Definition 5, the subpopulation to 
which   applies need not be small, but   itself is assumed close to  . The significance of this 
difference between the definitions is examined in Sections ‎ 6 and ‎ 9.  
If a population game  ̅ is derived from a symmetric multilinear game   as in Example 1, 
then, depending on whether   is viewed as a strategy in   or  ̅, Definition 4 or 5 applies. 
However, the point of view turns out to be immaterial.  
Proposition 1. A strategy   in a symmetric multilinear  -player game   is stable, weakly 
stable or definitely unstable if and only if it has the same property in the population game  ̅ 
defined by (3). 
Proof. For           and strategies  ,   and  
                    
the linearity of   in each of its second through  th arguments and its invariance to 
permutations of these arguments give 
 ̅          ̅                                    
  ∑                      ⋟    
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              ⋟    
         
      ⋟  
         
  
 
   
  
where  
              (
   
   )                            
are the Bernstein polynomials. These polynomials satisfy the equalities 










It therefore follows from (12) by integration that the expression obtained by replacing   on 
the left-hand side of (11) by  ̅ is equal to the expression on the left-hand side of (8).  ∎ 
In the subsequent sections, Definitions 4 and 5 are applied, or restricted, to a number of 
specific classes of symmetric and population games and the results are compared with 
certain “native” notions of stability for these games. The rest of the present section is 
concerned with an extension of the above framework, which facilitates the capturing of 
some additional native notions of stability.  
4.2    ̅-stability 
Stability as defined above in a sense occupies the midpoint between equilibrium and local 
superiority. It takes into consideration a player’s incentive to be the first or last to switch to 
a particular alternative strategy, but attaches to these extreme cases the same weight it 
attaches to each of the intermediate ones. This uniform distribution of weights may be 
interpreted as expressing a particular belief of the player about the total number of players 
who will be using the alternative strategy after he switches to it, with the rest using the 
original strategy. Namely, the probabilities            that that number is         are all 
equal: 
    
 
 
               
Thus, unlike local superiority, in which the gain from switching from strategy   to the 
alternative strategy   is computed under the belief that all the other players are using  , in 
stability the expected gain is with respect to the probabilities (14), which give the expression 
on the left-hand side of (8). A straightforward generalization of both concepts is to allow any 
beliefs.  
Definition 6. For a probability vector  ̅               , a strategy   in a symmetric  -
player game          is  ̅-stable, weakly  ̅-stable or definitely  ̅-unstable if it has a 
neighborhood where, for every strategy      , the inequality  
∑             ⋟    
         
      ⋟  
         
              ⋟    
         
      ⋟  
         
  
 
   
     
a similar weak inequality or the reverse (strict) inequality, respectively, holds.  
If each of the other players switches to   with probability   and stays with   with probability 
     , then, depending on whether the choices are perfectly correlated (i.e., identical) or 
independent, respectively,  
     {
            
                   
         
 
or  
     (
   





A strategy   is dependently- or independently-stable if it is  ̅-stable with  ̅                
given by (16) or (17), respectively, for all          .  
The number of other players using strategy   and the number using   have a symmetric joint 
distribution if the two numbers are equally distributed (and, in particular, have an equal 
expectation of          ), that is,  
                          
For  ̅                that satisfies (18), the left-hand side of (15) is equal to the more 
symmetrically-looking expression 
  ̅        ∑           ⋟    
       
                 ⋟    
       
        
 
   
 
Thus, a strategy   is  ̅-stable if and only if it has a neighborhood where it is the unique best 
response to itself in the symmetric two-player zero-sum game   ̅       . As a special case, 
this characterization applies to stability, that is, to  ̅ given by (14). A strategy   is 
symmetrically-stable if it is  ̅-stable for all  ̅ satisfying (18).   
For single-player games (     ), stability and  ̅-stability of a strategy mean the same thing, 
namely, strict local optimality: switching to any nearby alternative strategy reduces the 
payoff. For      , stability does not generally imply  ̅-stability (or vice versa) but the 
implication does partially hold (specifically, holds whenever             ) in the case of an 
equilibrium strategy (see (10)). To fully appreciate the differences between stability in the 
sense of Definition 4 and the varieties based on  ̅-stability it is necessary to look at 
multiplayer games. One class of such games is examined in Section ‎ 9.  
5  Finite games and risk dominance 
In every symmetric or population game, every isolated strategy is trivially stable. Therefore, 
if the strategy space   has the discrete topology, that is, all singletons are open sets, then all 
strategies are stable. The definition of stability is therefore of interest only for games with 
non-discrete strategy spaces. This includes games with a finite number of strategies where 
the topology on   is the trivial one, so that stability and definite instability mean global 
stability and definite instability (see Section ‎ 4). The simplest (interesting) such game is a 
finite symmetric two-player game with only two strategies, strategy   and strategy  , for 
example, the game with payoff matrix  
     
 
 
(   
   
) 
(where the rows correspond to the player’s own strategy and the columns to the opponent’s 
strategy). In this example, both strategies are equilibrium strategies. Strategy   is stable (in 
the sense of Definition 4, in the form (9)) and strategy   is definitely unstable, since 
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The two inequalities, which are clearly equivalent, have an additional meaning. Namely, they 
express the fact that       is the risk dominant equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). It is 
not hard to see that this coincidence of stability and risk dominance holds in general – it is 
not a special property of the payoffs in this example.   
Proposition 2. In a finite symmetric two-player game with two strategies, an equilibrium 
strategy   is globally stable if and only if the equilibrium       is risk dominant.  
For a pure equilibrium strategy  , risk dominance of       is equivalent to global stability of 
  also in the mixed extension   of the finite game, that is, when mixed strategies are 
allowed. This follows from the fact that global stability of   in the finite game implies that 
inequality (10) holds for all            , where   is the other pure strategy. Because of the 
bilinearity of  , the same is then true with   replaced by any convex combination of   and   
other than   itself, which proves that   is globally stable in  . However, since in the mixed 
extension of the finite game, which is a symmetric       game, the strategy space   is 
essentially the unit interval, the natural topology on   is not the trivial topology but the 
usual one. Stability with respect to the latter is a weaker condition than global stability. For 
example, as shown in the next section, it holds for both pure strategies if (as in the above 
example) the corresponding strategy profiles are strict equilibria.  
6  Symmetric       games and evolutionary stability 
A symmetric       game is given by a (square) payoff matrix   with these dimensions. The 
strategy space  , whose elements are referred to as mixed strategies, is the unit simplex in 
  . The interpretation is that there are   possible actions, and a strategy                  
is a probability vector specifying the probability    with which each action   is used 
(           ). The set of all actions   with        is the support of  . A strategy is pure or 
completely mixed if its support contains only a single action   (in which case the strategy 
itself may also be denoted by  ) or all   actions, respectively. The game (i.e., the payoff 
function)          is defined by 
              
(where superscript   denotes transpose and strategies are viewed as column vectors). Thus, 
  is bilinear, and     (      )
     
 
. 
A symmetric       game may be viewed either as a symmetric two-player game or as a 
population game. In the former case, Definition 4 applies, and in the latter, Definition 5. 
However, by Proposition 1, the two definitions of stability in fact coincide, and the same is 
true for weak stability and for definite instability. Moreover, as the next two results show, 
stability is also equivalent to evolutionary stability and to local superiority (see Section ‎ 3). It 
also follows from these results that every (even weakly) stable strategy in a symmetric       
game is an equilibrium strategy, and every strict equilibrium strategy is stable.  
The following proposition is rather well known (Bomze and Pötscher, 1989; van Damme, 
1991, Theorem 9.2.8; Weibull, 1995, Propositions 2.6 and 2.7; Bomze and Weibull, 1995).  11 
Proposition 3. For a strategy   in a symmetric       game  , the following conditions are 
equivalent:
7 
(i)  Strategy   is an ESS. 
(ii)  Strategy   is an ESS with uniform invasion barrier. 
(iii) For every strategy       in some neighborhood of  ,  
                 
(iv) For every      , the (weak) inequality                 holds, and if it holds as 
equality, then (19) also holds. 
An NSS is characterized by similar equivalent conditions, in which the strict inequality (19) is 
replaced by a weak one.  
A completely mixed equilibrium strategy   in a symmetric       game   is said to be 
definitely evolutionarily unstable (Weissing, 1991) if the reverse inequality to that in (19) 
holds for all      .  
Theorem 1. A strategy   in a symmetric       game   is stable or weakly stable if and only if 
it is an ESS or an NSS, respectively. A completely mixed equilibrium strategy is definitely 
unstable if and only if it is definitely evolutionarily unstable. 
Proof. The two inequalities in (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 3 together imply (9), and the same 
is true with the strict inequalities (9) and (19) both replaced by their weak versions. This 
proves that a sufficient condition for stability or weak stability of a strategy   is that it is an 
ESS or an NSS, respectively. For a completely mixed equilibrium strategy  , the inequality in 
(iv) automatically holds as equality for all  , and therefore a similar argument proves that a 
sufficient condition for definite instability of   is that it is definitely evolutionarily unstable. 
In remains to prove necessity. For a stable strategy  , (9) holds for all nearby strategies 
     . Therefore,   has the property that, for every strategy      , for sufficiently small 
      
                                                    
                                   
It follows from the bilinearity of   that (20) is equivalent to 
                                                   
Therefore, the above property of   is equivalent to (iv) of Proposition 3, which proves 
that   is an ESS. Similar arguments show that a weakly stable strategy is an NSS and that a 
definitely unstable completely mixed equilibrium strategy is definitely evolutionarily 
unstable. In the first case, the proof needs to be modified only by replacing the strict 
inequalities in (19), (20) and (21) by weak inequalities, and in the second case (in which the 
first term in (21) vanishes for all  ), they need to be replaced by the reverse inequalities.    ∎ 
                                                            
7 Note that condition (iii) means that   is locally superior and that the first part of (iv) means that it is 




7  Games with a unidimensional strategy space and continuous 
stability 
In a symmetric two-player game or population game where the strategy space is an interval 
in the real line  , stability or instability of an equilibrium strategy, in the sense of either 
Definition 4 or 5, has a simple, familiar meaning. As shown below, if the payoff function is 
twice continuously differentiable and with the possible exception of certain borderline 
cases, the equilibrium strategy is stable or definitely unstable if, at the (symmetric) 
equilibrium point, the graph of the best-response function, or reaction curve, intersects the 
forty-five degree line from above or below, respectively. This geometric characterization of 
stability and its differential counterpart are also shared by continuous stability (Section ‎ 3), 
which shows that these two notions of static stability are essentially equivalent.  
Theorem 2. Let   be a symmetric two-player game or population game with a strategy space 
  that is a (finite or infinite) interval in the real line  , and   an interior equilibrium strategy 
(that is, one lying in the interior of  ) such that   has continuous second-order partial 
derivatives
8 in a neighborhood of the equilibrium point      . If 
                          
then   is stable and a CSS. If the reverse inequality holds, then   is definitely unstable 
and not a CSS. 
Proof. Using Taylor’s theorem, it is not difficult to show that, for   tending to  , the left-hand 
sides of both (9) and (11) can be expressed as  
                
 
 
(                   )                        
Since   is an interior equilibrium strategy, the first term in (23) is zero. Therefore, a sufficient 
condition for (23) to be negative or positive for all       in some neighborhood of   (and 
hence for   to be stable or definitely unstable, respectively) is that                     has 
that sign.   
Next, consider the CSS condition in Definition 2. It may be possible to determine whether 




   
(                          )                   
For   tending to  , (24) is given by an expression similar to (23) except that it lacks the factor 
   . Therefore, if (22) or the reverse inequality holds, then (24) is negative or positive, 
respectively, for all       in some neighborhood of  . In the first or second case, (6) holds or 
does not hold, respectively, for       sufficiently close to   and the converse is true for 
     . Therefore, in the first case,   is a CSS, and in the second case, it is not a CSS.  ∎ 
                                                            
8 Partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts. For example,     is the mixed second-order partial 





Figure 1. An equilibrium strategy is stable (and a CSS) or definitely unstable (and not a CSS) if, at the 
equilibrium point, the reaction curve (thick line) intersects the forty-five degree line (thin) from above or 
below, respectively. 
The connection between inequality (22) and the slope of the reaction curve can be 
established as follows (Eshel, 1983). If   is an interior equilibrium strategy, then it follows 
from the equilibrium condition (2) that             and             . If the last inequality 
is in fact strict, then by the implicit function theorem there is a continuously differentiable 
function   from some neighborhood of   to the strategy space, with         , such that 
                and                 for all strategies   in the neighborhood. Thus, 
strategy      is a local best response to  . By the chain rule, at the point   
         
        
        
  
Therefore, (22) holds (so that   is stable) or the reverse inequality holds (  definitely 
unstable) if and only if the slope of the function   at   is less or greater than  , respectively.
9 
In the first case, the reaction curve (see Figure 1), which is the graph of  , intersects the forty-
five degree line from above (which means that the (local) fixed point index is   ; see Dold, 
1980). In the second case, the intersection is from below (and the fixed point index is   ).  
In a population or symmetric two-player game with a unidimensional strategy space, an 
equilibrium strategy   that is locally superior is said to be a neighborhood invader strategy 
(Apaloo, 1997). As shown (see Section ‎ 4), such a strategy is necessarily stable. However, 
unlike for symmetric       games (Section ‎ 6), the converse is false. This can be seen most 
easily by considering the differential condition for local superiority of an equilibrium strategy 
  (Oechssler and Riedel, 2002). This condition differs from (22) in that the second term 
         is multiplied by  . Since, by the equilibrium condition, the first term          is 
necessarily nonpositive, this makes the condition more demanding than (22). 
8  Potential games 
A symmetric  -player game          is called an (exact) potential game if it has an (exact) 
potential, which is a symmetric function (that is, a function that is invariant under 
permutations of its   arguments)          such that, whenever a single player changes 
his strategy, the change in the player’s payoff is equal to the change in  . Thus, for any 
                                                            
9 This geometric condition for static stability is weaker than the corresponding one for dynamic 
stability, which requires the absolute value of slope to be less than   (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995).  





      (not necessarily distinct) strategies             , 
                                                             
The potential is unique up to an additive constant. Clearly, a necessarily condition for 
the existence of a potential is that the total change of payoff of two players who change 
their strategies one after the other does not depend on the order of their moves: For any 
      strategies                , 
                                                             
                                                                 
It is not difficult to show that this condition is also sufficient (see Monderer and Shapley, 
1996, Theorem 2.8, which however refers to general, not necessarily symmetric, games, for 
which the potential function is also not symmetric). Moreover, if   is the mixed extension of 
a finite game, then   is a potential game if and only if the above condition holds for (any 
     ) pure strategies (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Lemma 2.10). In this case, the 
potential, like the game   itself, is multilinear.  
Example 3. Symmetric       games. Every symmetric       game  , with pure strategies   
and  , is a potential game, since it is easy to see that it satisfies the above condition for pure 
strategies. It is moreover not difficult to check that the following bilinear function is a 
potential for  : 
                                                        
The potential   of a symmetric potential game   may itself be viewed as a symmetric  -
player game, indeed, a doubly symmetric one.
10 It follows immediately from (25) that   and 
  have exactly the same equilibrium strategies, stable and weakly stable strategies, and 
definitely unstable strategies. Stability and instability in this case have a strikingly simple 
characterization, which follows immediately from the observation that the sum in (8) is 
equal the difference                         divided by  .  
Theorem 3. In a symmetric  -player game with a potential  , a strategy   is stable, weakly 
stable or definitely unstable if and only if it is a strict local maximum point, a local maximum 
point or a strict local minimum point, respectively, of the function              . If 
          is a global maximum point of   itself, then   is in addition an equilibrium 
strategy. 
The following simple result illustrates the theorem. It also makes use of Theorem 1 and 
Example 3. 
Corollary 1. In a symmetric       game   with pure strategies   and  , a (mixed) strategy is 
an ESS or an NSS if and only if it is a strict local maximum point or a local maximum point, 
respectively, of the quadratic function         defined by  
                                                            
10 A symmetric game is doubly symmetric if it has a symmetric payoff function, which means that the 
players’ payoffs are always equal. 
(25) 
(26) 15 
      
 
 
                   
   
 
 
                   
   
8.1  Potential in population games 
For population games, which represent interactions involving many players whose individual 
actions have negligible effects on the other players, the definition of potential may be 
naturally adapted by replacing the difference on the left-hand side of (25) with a derivative.  
Definition 7. For a population game         , a continuous function         is a 




                                                            
Example 4. Symmetric       games, viewed as population games. It is easy to check that, for 
every such game  , with pure strategies   and  , the function   defined by (27) is a 
potential. Note that, unlike the function   defined in (26),   is a function of one variable 
only.  
Example 4 and Corollary 1 hint at the following general result (which, in view of the example, 
provides an alternative proof for the corollary). As for symmetric games, stability and 
instability (here, in the sense of Definition 5) of a strategy   in a population game with a 
potential   is related to   being a local extremum point of the potential. 
Theorem 4. In a population game   with a potential  , a strategy   is stable, weakly stable 
or definitely unstable if and only if it is a strict local maximum point of  , a local maximum 
point of   or a strict local minimum point of  , respectively. In the first two cases,   is in 
addition an equilibrium strategy. If the potential   is strictly concave, an equilibrium 
strategy is a strict global maximum point of  , and, necessarily, the game’s unique stable 
strategy.  








This integral equals            , which proves the first part of the theorem. It also follows 




    
                                    
If   is a local maximum point of  , then the left-hand side is nonpositive, which proves that 
  is an equilibrium strategy.  
To prove the last part of the theorem, consider an equilibrium strategy  . For any strategy 
     , the right-, and hence also the left-, hand side of (29) is nonpositive. If   is strictly 
concave, this implies that the left-hand side of (28) is negative for all          , which 




Since a potential is by definition a continuous function, an immediate corollary of Theorem 4 
is the following result, which concerns the existence of (at least) weakly stable strategies. It 
sheds light on the difference in this respect between symmetric       games and, for 
example,       games. The former, which as indicated are potential games, always have at 
least one NSS, whereas for the latter, it is well known that this is not so. 
Corollary 2. If a population game   with a potential   has a compact strategy space, then it 
has at least one weakly stable strategy. If in addition the number of such strategies is finite, 
they are all stable.  
The term potential is borrowed from physics, where it refers to a scalar field whose gradient 
gives the force field. Force is analogous to incentive here. The analogy can be taken one step 
further by presenting the payoff function   as the differential of the potential  . This 
requires   to be defined not only on the strategy space   (which by definition is a convex 
set in a linear topological space) but on its cone   ̂, which is the collection of all space 
elements that can be written as a strategy   multiplied by a positive number  . For example, 
if strategies are probability measures,   needs to be defined for all positive, non-zero finite 
measures. The differential of the potential can then be defined as its directional derivative, 
that is, as the function      ̂      given by
11  




          ̂     ̂   
The differential exists if the (right) derivative in (30) exists for all   ̂   ̂     ̂. 
Proposition 4. Let          be a population game and     ̂     a continuous function (on 
the cone of the strategy space) such that      ̂      exists, is continuous in the second 
argument and satisfies  
                           
Then the restriction of   to   is a potential for  . 
Proof (an outline). Using elementary arguments, the following can be established. 
Fact. A continuous real-valued function defined on an open real interval is continuously 
differentiable if and only if it has a continuous right derivative.  
Replacing   ̂ in (30) by    ̂     ̂ gives 




          ̂     ̂     ̂   ̂     ̂        
By the above Fact and the continuity properties of   and   , for           the right 
derivative in (32) is actually a two-sided derivative and it depends continuously on   ̂. 
Therefore, by (31), the right-hand side of (28) is equal to  
                                                            







   




     
            
By the chain rule, this expression gives the derivative on the left-hand side of (28).  ∎ 
Proposition 4 is quite useful. Many population games, like that in the following example, are 
themselves readily extendable to the cone of the strategy space. In addition, (31) may be 
more suggestive of the actual form of the potential than (28).  
Example 5. Nonatomic congestion games. In a game   as in Example 2, the payoff function 
(4) is meaningful not only for (mixed) strategies, but for all         
 . The following well-
known (see Milchtaich, 2004, Section 5) function     
      clearly satisfies (31): 




   
  
Since the cost functions are continuous and strictly increasing,   is continuous and strictly 
concave. Therefore, by Proposition 4, the restriction of   to the strategy space   is a strictly 
concave potential for  . By Theorem 4, its unique maximum point is the unique equilibrium 
strategy in the game and the unique stable strategy.  
9  Symmetric multilinear games 
Symmetric multilinear games are the  -player generalization of the two-player games 
considered in Section ‎ 6. The strategy space   is the unit simplex in a Euclidean space and 
         is linear in each of the   arguments.  
As Proposition 1 shows, stability in a symmetric multilinear game   is equivalent to stability 
in the population game  ̅ defined by (3). Requiring the same for evolutionary stability (which 
for a population game is given by Definition 1) yields the following natural definition.A 
strategy   in a symmetric multilinear game   is an ESS if, for every      , for sufficiently 
small       the strategy                      satisfies  
                             
Strategy   is an ESS with uniform invasion barrier if it satisfies the stronger condition that, 
for sufficiently small       (which cannot vary with  ), inequality (33) holds for all      . 
Note that for the existence of a uniform invasion barrier it suffices that the last condition 
holds for some          , since this automatically implies the same for all smaller  .  
An equivalent definition of ESS is given by a generalization of condition (iv) in Proposition 3 
(Broom et al., 1997; see also the proof of Lemma 3 below).  
Lemma 1. A strategy   in a symmetric multilinear game   is an ESS if and only if, for every 
     , at least one of the   terms in the sum on the left-hand side of (8) is not zero, and the 
first such term is negative. In particular, an ESS is necessarily an equilibrium strategy. 
(33) 18 
Unlike in the special case       (Proposition 3), in a general multilinear game not every ESS 
has a uniform invasion barrier. It is easy to see that a sufficient condition for this is that the 
ESS is locally superior, and this condition is in fact also necessary (Bomze and Weibull, 1995, 
Theorem 3; Lemma 2 below). This raises the question of how stability (in the sense of 
Definition 4) compares with the two nonequivalent notions of ESS. As the following theorem 
shows, it occupies an intermediate position: weaker than one and stronger than the other. 
The two ESS conditions are also comparable with the stronger stability conditions derived 
from  ̅-stability (see Section ‎ 4.2). In fact, two of the latter turn out to be equivalent to ESS 
with uniform invasion barrier.  
Theorem 5. In a symmetric multilinear game, with       players, the following implications 
and equivalences among the possible properties of a strategy hold:  
ESS ⇐ stable ⇐ ESS with uniform invasion barrier ⇔ locally superior ⇔ dependently-
stable ⇔ independently-stable ⇐ symmetrically-stable. 
Each of the three implications is actually an equivalence in the special case of two-player 
games but not in general.  
The proof of Theorem 5 uses the following two lemmas, which hold for every game   as in 
the theorem. The first lemma uses the following terminology. An equilibrium strategy   in   
is conditionally locally superior if it has a neighborhood where every strategy       for 
which (1) holds as equality satisfies inequality (7). 
Lemma 2. For any          , the following properties of an equilibrium strategy   are 
equivalent, and imply that   is stable: 
(i)  Local superiority 
(ii)  Conditional local superiority  
(iii)  ̅-stability with  ̅                given by (16)  
(iv)  ̅-stability with  ̅                given by (17) 
(v)  ESS with uniform invasion barrier. 
Proof. The implication (i) ⇒ (iii) is trivial: inequality (1) (from the equilibrium condition) and 
inequality (7) together give 
       (                       )    (                       )      
Clearly, if in the last inequality the first term on the left-hand side is zero, the second must 
be negative. This proves that (iii) ⇒ (ii).  
To prove that (ii) ⇒ (i), assume that this implication does not hold: strategy   is conditionally 
locally superior but not locally superior. The assumption means that there is a sequence 
        of strategies that converges to   such that for all    
                             
and 
                                  
(34) 
(35) 19 
By (34), when all the other players use  , strategy    is not a best response. Therefore, it can 
be presented as  
                        
where           ,    is a strategy whose support includes only pure strategies that are 
not best responses when everyone else uses the equilibrium strategy  , and    is a strategy 
that is a best response:  
                              
Since there are only finitely many pure strategies, there is some       such that for all   
                                
By (35), (36), (37) and (38), for all   
(                           )   (                         )         
As      , the two expressions in parentheses tend to zero, since       . Therefore, 
      , which by (36) implies that       . Since   is conditionally locally superior and (37) 
holds for all  , for almost all   (that is, all      , for some integer  )                
                . Therefore, for almost all   
∑
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(                            )  
The sum on the left-hand side tends to zero as      , since       . Therefore, for almost 
all   the expression on the right-hand side is less than  , so that 
                                    
On the other hand, by (38) and since       , for almost all   
   ((                        )   (           
               )   (                           ))        
By (36) and (37), the left-hand side is equal to                              , which by 
(35) is less than or equal to  
                              





To prove that (i) ⇒ (iv), assume that   is locally superior, and thus has a convex 
neighborhood   where (7) holds for every strategy      . By the convexity of   and the 
linearity of   in the first argument, for every         { }  
                                 
where                      . By the second equality in (12), (40) is equivalent to (15), with 
             given by (17). Thus,   has property (iv).  
Clearly, the above arguments also apply with   replaced by any other number in      . 
Integration over this interval therefore gives that, for every         { }, (15) holds also with 
           given (not by (17) but) by the left-hand side of the corresponding equality in 
(13). The equalities in (13) therefore prove that the locally superior strategy   is stable. 
The proof of the reverse implication (iv) ⇒ (i) is rather similar. As shown above,   has 
property (iv) if and only if it has a neighborhood   such that (40) holds for all strategies 
      in  , or equivalently (7) holds for all       in the set 
     {              ∣ ∣      }  
In this case,   is locally superior, since    is also a neighborhood of  . Indeed, for any 
neighborhood   of any strategy  , {  }      is a base for the neighborhood system of   
(see Bomze and Pötscher, 1989, Lemma 42; Bomze, 1991, Lemma 6).   
The special case       of the last topological fact gives the equivalence (i) ⇔ (v). A strategy 
  has a neighborhood where (7) holds for all       if and only if it has such a neighborhood 
of the form   , for some          .   ∎ 
Lemma 3. For a probability vector  ̅                with       , every  ̅-stable strategy   
is an ESS.  
Proof. For a vector  ̅ as above, let   be a  ̅-stable strategy and   any other strategy. For 
sufficiently small          , 
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This implies that, for          , at least one of the   terms on the right-hand side is not 
zero, and the first nonzero term (that is, the one ending with the smallest power of  ) is 
moreover negative. Since       , the first expression in parentheses (i.e., the inner sum) is 
positive, and hence does not affect the sign of the coefficient. This proves that the condition 
in Lemma 1 holds.  ∎ 
(40) 21 
Proof of Theorem 5. By Lemma 3, a strategy that has any of the seven properties in the 
theorem is an ESS, and hence (by Lemma 1) an equilibrium strategy. An immediate corollary 
of Lemma 2 is that, for an equilibrium strategy, the properties of local superiority, 
dependent- and independent stability, and ESS with uniform invasion barrier are equivalent, 
and imply stability. The special case         of the same lemma shows that symmetric-
stability implies local superiority.  
With only two players (     ), there is no difference between stability and symmetric-
stability, and thus the equivalence of all the properties in the theorem follows from the first 
part of the proof and Proposition 3. The counterexamples in Example 6 below (where    
 ) complete the proof.  ∎ 
Example 6. A symmetric multilinear four-player game   is defined as follows. There are 
three pure strategies, so that the strategy space   consists of all probability vectors 
               (with                 ). The payoff of a player using strategy   against 
opponents using strategies               ,                and                is given by 
             ∑              
 
         
  
It does not matter which of the other players uses which strategy, since the coefficients 
                
   that define the game satisfy the symmetry condition                 , for all   
and all triplets         and            that are permutations of one another. There are three 
versions of the game, with different coefficients, as detailed in the following table: 
Coefficient  Version 1  Version 2  Version 3 
                   
                  
               
                
                 
                
                   
               
Coefficients that are not listed in the table and cannot be deduced from it by using the 
symmetry condition are zero. In all three versions of the game, the strategy             is an 
equilibrium strategy, since if all the other players use  , the payoff is zero regardless of the 
player’s own strategy. However, the stability properties of   are different for the three 
versions. 
Claim. The equilibrium strategy             is an ESS in all three versions of the game, but it 
is stable only in versions 2 and 3, independently-stable (equivalently, dependently-stable, 
locally superior, ESS with uniform invasion barrier) only in version 3, and symmetrically-
stable in none of them.  
The Claim has some significance beyond the present context. The fact that, in version 2 of 
the game, the ESS         does not have a uniform invasion barrier and is not locally 22 
superior refutes two published results. A theorem of Crawford (1990), which is reproduced 
by Hammerstein and Selten (1994, Result 7), implies that every ESS in a symmetric 
multilinear game has a uniform invasion barrier. However, there is a known error in the 
proof of that theorem (Bomze and Pötscher, 1993). Theorem 2 of Bukowski and Miekisz 
(2004) asserts that local superiority and the ESS condition are equivalent even for      . 
However, these authors employ a definition of ESS that is different from that used here (and 
elsewhere) in that it requires the existence of a uniform invasion barrier. 
In view of Theorem 5, to prove the Claim it suffices to show that   is: (i) an ESS but not 
stable in version 1, (ii) stable but not independently-stable in version 2, and (iii) 
independently-stable but not symmetrically-stable in version 3.  
In version 1 of  , (15) reads  
      
            
      
          
  
         
   
         
             
      
       
   
      
       
          
Stability corresponds to  ̅                                    , for which the above 




        
 
 
             
There are strategies                arbitrarily close to but different from         for which 
this inequality does not hold. For example, this is so whenever                        . 
This proves that the equilibrium strategy is not stable. To prove that it is nevertheless an 
ESS, consider (33), which in the present case can be simplified to   
   
                         
For every (fixed) strategy                         , this inequality holds for sufficiently 
small      . Therefore,         is an ESS.  





        
 
 
             
This inequality holds for all strategies   other than        , and therefore the latter is stable. 
However, it is not independently-stable, since for  ̅                     inequality (15) can 




         
 
 
             
This inequality does not hold for strategies   with                        , which exist in 
every neighborhood of        . 
Finally, in version 3 of the game, for  ̅                      inequality (15) can be 
simplified to  23 
   
                          
This inequality holds for all strategies   other than        . Therefore, by Lemma 2 (which 
implies that, if (iv) holds for        , it holds for all          ),         is independently-
stable. However, it is not symmetrically-stable. There are probability vectors  ̅ satisfying (18) 
for which (15) does not hold for some strategies   arbitrarily close to        . For examples, 
for  ̅                        , inequality (15) can be simplified to 
    




                        
For strategies   with                    , this inequality is equivalent to            
                                               . Hence, it does not hold if    is 
sufficiently close to  . This completes the proof of the Claim. 
Appendix A. Other notions of stability  
Static and dynamic stability are not the only kinds of stability in strategic games considered 
in the game-theoretic literature. For completeness, some of the other categories are briefly 
reviewed below.  
One kind of stability refers to the effects of perturbations of the players’ strategy spaces 
(e.g., allowing only completely mixed strategies) or a combination of perturbations of the 
strategy spaces and of the strategies themselves. The requirement that a strategy profile in a 
strategic game is stable against these kinds of perturbations gives the notions of (trembling-
hand) perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978), strict 
perfection (Okada, 1981) and (strategic) stability and full stability (Kohlberg and Mertens, 
1986). Stability may also refer to the effects on a given equilibrium of perturbations of the 
payoff functions. Essentiality (Wu and Jiang, 1962) and strong stability (Kojima et al., 1985) 
are examples of this kind of stability, which has interesting links with some of the other 
kinds. For example, in multilinear games, every essential equilibrium is strictly perfect (van 
Damme, 1991, Theorem 2.4.3), and in symmetric       games, every regular ESS is essential 
(Selten, 1983). Another example of a link between different kinds of stability is the finding 
that, in several classes of games, the (local) degree of an equilibrium (or of a connected 
component of equilibria) is equal to its index (Govindan and Wilson, 1997; Demichelis and 
Germano, 2000). The index of an equilibrium is connected with its asymptotic stability or 
instability with respect to a large class of natural dynamics, which determine how strategies 
in the game change over time. The degree, by contrast, expresses a topological property of 
the equilibrium when viewed as a point in a manifold that includes the various equilibria of 
different games (Ritzberger, 2002). The index (= degree) of an equilibrium is connected with 
stability also in that, in a nondegenerate bimatrix game, it determines whether it can be 
made the unique equilibrium by extending the game, adding one or more pure strategies to 
one of the players (von Schemde and von Stengel, 2008). 
Whether any of these alternative notions can be linked with statics stability is yet to be 
determined.  24 
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